WHO CAN FILE?
An issue that may arise is who can file an action: can an applicant be either a petitioner or a respondent?
The convention appears to be worded in such a way as to address remedies for the benefit of the petitioner or applicant which apply only to the parent or institution that has lost custody of the child and is seeking return of the child. 
HOW TO FILE
A person wishing to institute judicial proceedings under the convention does so by filing a petition in the court whose venue includes the place where the child can be found. The petition, in order to
give the court jurisdiction to hear the matter, must allege at least the following:
(1) the child was removed from his or her habitual residence;
(2) the petitioner had and was exercising, at the time of the removal, 
OBJECTIONS TO RETURN
Once the petitioner has made out the prima facie case by establishing that there was a 'wrongful removal' or 'wrongful retention', by showing that the child was (6) The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views (the age and maturity defence).
There is one additional objection to return under art. 20, namely if it is objectionable on human rights grounds.
This objection also requires clear and convincing evidence, but this is so intertwined with art. 13(b) that, when it is raised, it is usually considered part of a 1 3(b) defence. Based on a review of art. 1 2 and its one-year period, and further based on a reading of the applicable cases, it is suggested that if the passive period is less than one vear, the burden should be on the respondent to show that this was acquiescence. If more than one year has passed, it is suggested that the burden now shifts to the petitioner to show that this was not acquiescence.
Well-settled objection

Exercising rights of custody objection
The convention includes no definition of 'actual exercise of custody', but this provision expressly refers to the care of the child and must be liberally interpreted. The Australian courts have held that the fact that the parent and child were living in the same household was sufficient to show that a parent was actually exercising rights of custody.
In keeping with the spirit of the convention, there is a presumption that findings will be made by the courts that will cause the child to be returned. The 
Grave risk objection
This is the infamous 13(b) defence. A further factor to be considered is that even where it can be shown that the petitioner is unfit to care for the child, the child will still be returned to his or her habitual residence so long as the courts of the habitual residence can assure the courts of the requested state that the child will be protected (e.g. 
THE WISH OF THE CHILD
The issue of age and maturity is not to be looked upon as an issue ot the wish of the child to live with one parent or the other. The issue only relates to the child's objection to being returned to his or her habitual residence. The first step is to determine it the child has reached an age and degree of maturity where his or her opinion would even be considered, and then the wishes of the child must be considered in the light of all other relevant facts.
Even with the above strictures placed on the court's consideration of an art. 
Age and maturity objection
The final objection to return is the age and maturity test, where, in the words of the convention:
'the judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child ifitjinds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.'
As with the other exceptions under art. 13, this one is to be used sparingly since, as noted above, the presumption is that the child will be returned to his or her habitual residence. 
